Why does Strawson consider person to be a primitive concept ? What implication does it have for the mind-body dualism? Discuss.

Strawson’s Concept of the ‘Person’ as Primitive

Strawson contends that the concept of a ‘person’ – a being capable of language, self-awareness, and rational agency – is a basic, unanalyzable concept. He argues against the idea that we first perceive a private, subjective ‘I’ and then infer the existence of a body. Instead, our understanding of ourselves and others arises from our interactions within a social and physical world. He introduces the concept of a ‘minimal self’ which is not a metaphysical entity but a practical necessity for attributing mental states.

The Rejection of the ‘Subjective Character’

Central to Strawson’s argument is his rejection of the idea of a ‘subjective character’ – a purely inner, private realm of experience that exists independently of any physical or social context. He argues that attributing mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) is not a matter of inferring something hidden behind a veil of sensation, but rather a fundamental aspect of our social interactions. We attribute mental states to others (and ourselves) as a matter of course, based on observable behavior and our shared understanding of human agency. This attribution is not based on a prior knowledge of a subjective ‘I’ but is constitutive of our understanding of persons.

Implications for Mind-Body Dualism

Strawson’s view has profound implications for mind-body dualism, particularly Cartesian dualism. Descartes believed that the mind and body are fundamentally different substances, capable of existing independently of each other. Strawson challenges this by arguing that the very notion of a disembodied mind is incoherent. He suggests that the idea of a self without a body, or a consciousness existing independently of a social context, is a philosophical illusion.

The Problem of Category Mistakes

Strawson employs the concept of a ‘category mistake’ to illustrate the flaws in dualistic thinking. A category mistake occurs when we attribute properties to something that do not belong to its category. He argues that Descartes’ attempt to locate the mind within the body, as a separate substance, commits a category mistake. The mind is not *in* the body in the same way that a thought is in a head; rather, mental states are *of* the body and its interactions with the world.

The Role of Social Context

Strawson emphasizes the crucial role of social context in shaping our understanding of ourselves and others. Our concept of a person is inherently social; we learn to understand ourselves as individuals through our interactions with others. This social dimension undermines the dualistic notion of a private, subjective self that exists independently of any external influence. The very language we use to describe mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) is inherently intersubjective, relying on shared meanings and understandings.

Objections and Counterarguments

Strawson’s view is not without its critics. Some argue that he merely shifts the problem rather than solving it. Even if we accept that the concept of a person is primitive, it doesn’t necessarily eliminate the question of how mental states relate to physical states. Others contend that Strawson’s emphasis on social context overlooks the possibility of subjective experiences that are not directly tied to social interaction, such as dreams or hallucinations. Furthermore, some philosophers argue that Strawson’s account struggles to explain the qualitative character of experience – the ‘what it’s like’ aspect of consciousness (qualia).

Dualism (Descartes)	Strawson’s View
Mind and body are distinct substances.	Concept of ‘person’ is primitive and prior to mind-body separation.
Mind can exist independently of the body.	Disembodied mind is incoherent; self is tied to body and social context.
Mental states are inferred from observable behavior.	Attributing mental states is constitutive of understanding persons.